Dodge Corporation and a lifelong confidant of the president; and veteran missionary William W. Peet, as well as Garegin Pasdermadjian, the informal American representative of the Armenian National Council in Tiflis.9
By the fall of 1918, Barton and his committee had formulated a definite approach to the Armenian national question. First, they recommended the creation of an international commission to look after the surviving Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and disarm Turkey's defeated troops. As a long-range solution, the committee called for an independent Armenia consisting of the six traditional vilayets of Turkish Armenia, the Russian Armenian provinces of Kars and Erevan, the vilayet of Trebizond along the Black Sea, and the vilayet of Adana in Armenian Cilicia.'o The proposal was undeniably ambitious in its territorial claims, but not out of step with the optimism that characterized the closing days of the war. Projecting the United States as guardian of the fledgling Armenian state, Barton declared: "Give the Armenian capital and a righteous government and he will turn the whole of Turkey into a Garden of Eden in ten years." The British, however, were not so buoyant and chose to leave the committee's ideas out of the Mudros Armistice of October 30, 1918." Secretary of State Robert Lansing was also reluctant to press for American involvment in the Near East.
Actually, the notion of an independent Armenian nation-state had only recently merited serious consideration. Western political concepts had gradually seeped into the crumbling Ottoman social order during the nineteenth century, often through the curriculum of the American Board schools. In the case of the Armenians, however, the experience of national independence was linked directly to the upheaval of World War I. By May 1918 this turbulence had already produced a small Armenian republic in the Caucasus, tucked between hostile neighbors and overflowing with a million destitute inhabitants. Independence was assured only when Armenia's army turned back the Turks near the capital of Erevan, and even then peace did little to comfort Armenia's pathetic refugees.
In In fact, the men who composed the ACIA were a somewhat curious lot. Most were wealthy and well-bred. With the notable exception of Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, few were identifiably ethnic. Protestant ideals and a sense of patrician duty were perhaps the strongest bonds among them. James W. Gerard, chairman of the ACIA for nearly a decade, shared much in common with other ACIA members. The son of an attorney and New York state senator, Gerard followed his father and grandfather in attending a prestigious preparatory school and then Columbia College. He served as ambassador to Germany until 1917 and upon his return found himself deeply embroiled in Armenian affairs. In his autobiography, however, Gerard allots only two sketchy pages to his involvement with the Armenians and remains befuddled as to why the Armenians turned to him in their hour of need.'6 During his years as ACIA chairman, though, Gerard acted as the willing mouthpiece of Cardashian's tireless diplomacy, and also demonstrated a sincere personal commitment to the purpose of the ACIA. 
